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Sherlock Holmes and Newt Scamander:  Incorporating Protected 




Author J.K. Rowling published a book in 2001 under the pseudonym Newt 
Scamander with an “About the Author” section that provided a brief outline of the 
fictional author.1  Prior to this brief biographical section, fans of the Harry Potter 
universe had only been introduced to the character of Scamander in passing as the 
author of a required textbook that the main characters purchased.2  Rowling 
subsequently announced that she would pen the screenplays for a trilogy of films 
featuring this very minor character as the lead.3  Although Rowling is (ostensibly) 
the sole author of the Harry Potter books and the companion book, Fantastic Beasts 
and Where to Find Them, she will likely be considered a joint owner of the 
copyright in the film she is writing.4  It is foreseeable, therefore, that the copyright 
in the books and the films might expire at different times, if one of the joint 
creators of the film dies after Rowling.5  This, then, would result in the question of 
when the character of Newt Scamander enters the public domain.  If Scamander 
was a copyrightable character when introduced in the Harry Potter series and 
companion book, can a portion of his character enter the public domain when those 
books expire, while the rest of his character remains protected until the expiration 
of the film’s copyright?  This is further complicated by the fact that this 
development is nonlinear, meaning that the films will focus on Scamander’s youth 
and young adulthood, while the books only refer to the character after he has 
already died.   
This Note focuses on copyright protection of literary characters featured in 
multiple works, some of which are in the public domain but others of which remain 
 
 * Columbia Law School, J.D., 2015.  My thanks to Professor Robert Clarida and my student 
editors Jerry Tower and Mea Lewis for their advice and guidance. 
 1. See Newton Scamander, HARRY POTTER WIKI, http://perma.cc/N59F-NVBU (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2015) (providing general background information about the character). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Nick Clark, JK Rowling to Write New Harry Potter-Inspired Film Series Based on Fantastic 
Beasts and Where to Find Them, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 2013), http://perma.cc/9TSQ-GUYD. 
 4. See 1 MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.05 (rev. ed. 1978–date) 
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (“A motion picture is a joint work consisting of a number of 
contributions by different ‘authors,’ including the writer of the screenplay, the director, the 
photographer, the actors, and, arguably, other contributors such as the set and costume designers, etc.”). 
 5. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2012). 
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protected.  In multiple work circumstances, new character elements are often 
revealed in these still-copyrighted later works that fundamentally change the way 
we think of and write about the earlier version of the character.  This Note proposes 
a test for how derivative works featuring such characters should be analyzed for 
infringement.  There are two instances this Note will focus on:  first, where the 
character is not copyrightable in the initial instance in which the character appears 
in a work, and second, where the character develops over time in a way that 
changes the reader’s perception of the character in a fundamental way. 
Generally, once a work enters the public domain, all of the characters appearing 
in that work also enter the public domain, while plot points written about in 
subsequent works remain protected if still subject to copyright.6  However, it is 
common for writers to reveal “prequel” details in later works, which can make it 
difficult for creators of derivative works to know what they may include, where 
their characters that have only partially entered the public domain.7  As one party 
argued in Klinger v. Doyle—a case that focuses on this issue and that will be a 
focus of this Note—characters can become as dynamic as human beings; one 
cannot simply forget knowledge of traits about them or important experiences they 
have had when writing a new work.8  In Klinger, the court ruled in favor of a 
Sherlock Holmes aficionado who claimed that the characters of Holmes and Dr. 
Watson should be in the public domain, despite the fact that later stories revealing 
new information about earlier versions of those characters remain subject to 
copyright protection.9 
With that background in mind, this Note will focus on the breadth and 
boundaries of character copyright protection in connection with characters featured 
in a series of works, only some of which are in the public domain.  Particular 
attention will be paid to instances where the protected works are prequel in nature.  
Specifically, this Note addresses the amount of protection to which a character 
should be entitled once the initial work in which that character appears enters the 
public domain, and argues that limited copyright protection should be available to 
creators of certain types of dynamic recurring characters beyond the copyright 
expiration of the first work in which the character appears, even when the 
 
 6. See, e.g., Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the titular 
characters in Amos ‘n’ Andy were sufficiently delineated to deserve copyright protection, but that the 
characters entered the public domain upon expiration of the copyright of the first work in which they 
appeared and only any “incremental expressions” added to their characters later in the series remained 
protected). 
 7. “Prequel” details means facts that are revealed later in the series that occurred earlier in the 
fictional timeline of the series than when they appear. 
 8. Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to 
FRCP 56 at 2, Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 
01226), 2013 WL 5538334, at *2 [hereinafter Doyle’s Response to Klinger’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment] (“Plaintiff suggests that Holmes and Watson can be dismantled into partial versions of 
themselves.  But a complex literary personality can no more be unraveled without disintegration than a 
human personality.”). 
 9. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 458 (2014); see, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative 
Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 34 (2006). 
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derivatives created do not explicitly refer to plot disclosed in the still-copyrighted 
works featuring the character. 
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of copyright in fictional characters 
more generally, including a summary of the two tests that are primarily used today 
to establish character copyright.  Part II of this Note will briefly review the legal 
regime surrounding the creation and protection of derivative works, namely works 
in a series and sequels, including a review of case law concerning the protection of 
fictional characters in a series.  Specific attention will be given to the recent case 
Klinger v. Doyle, which focuses on the protection of fictional characters written 
about in a nonlinear fashion, where the earlier works debuting the characters have 
entered the public domain, but later works that remain protected reveal important 
character details.  Finally, the Note will offer a suggested framework for 
approaching characters developed over the course of a series in a nonlinear fashion 
and will argue that this framework would be effective given specific goals of the 
Copyright Act. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON CHARACTER COPYRIGHT 
A.  CHARACTER COPYRIGHT GENERALLY 
Characters are not copyrightable per se, even in cases where the plot of the story 
in which the characters appear is protected by copyright.10  Rather, fictional 
characters are only guaranteed copyright protection apart from the work in which 
they appear if they are sufficiently delineated; the more detailed the character, the 
more copyright protection it will be accorded.11  To be clear, the actions the 
character undertakes will still comprise a copyrightable plot, so long as the plot 
fulfills the low threshold requisite for originality, though the character as distinct 
from the plot might not.  So, the character’s voice, likeness, traits, emotions and 
habits might not be independently copyrightable from the situations in which the 
character appears in the works.  The majority of courts favor the following two-part 
test for determining whether character copyright has been infringed:12  first, the 
plaintiff’s character must be sufficiently delineated to be subject to copyright 
protection, and second, the defendant must have copied such delineation.13 
There is no bright line rule to determine whether or not a character is sufficiently 
delineated to command protection in accordance with the first prong of the majority 
test.  However, case law has revealed some guiding principles to consider.  As a 
 
 10. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12. 
 11. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 
U.S. 902 (1931) (“It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that 
is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.”).  However, note that the 
Copyright Office will not register copyright in characters per se, despite the case law.  U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.4(H) (3d ed. 2014), available at 
https://perma.cc/B4E9-4HLG?type=pdf. 
 12. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12. 
 13. See, e.g., Warner Bros, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 
720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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preliminary matter, as in other areas of copyright law, the character must be 
sufficiently original to command protection in the first place.  This is in line with 
the principle that “scenes à faire,” or stock scenes that are common in many works, 
are not subject to copyright protection because they are insufficiently distinct.14  In 
the same vein, “hackneyed character types,” or stock characters that commonly 
appear in many works, such as a bartender who is a good listener or a bumbling 
police officer, are likewise not protectable.15  When an author copies an outline of a 
character or uses a well-known character type rather than creating a more 
idiosyncratic, dynamic character, it is more analogous to copying ideas—which are 
not subject to copyright protection—than it is to creating expression of those 
ideas—which do qualify for such protection.16  Thus, the more detailed authors 
make their plots and the more idiosyncratic they make their characters, the more 
likely they will cross the threshold from idea into expression, and therefore the 
more likely their works will earn higher levels of copyright protection.17  Second, 
cartoons and graphic representations of characters, in contrast with “word portraits“ 
of characters, are more likely to command higher copyright protection because 
courts have stated that readers are more likely to have more varied interpretations 
of characters when reading descriptions of characters than when viewing visual 
representations of characters.18 
 
 14. See, e.g., Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (describing scenes à faire 
as “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in 
the treatment of a given topic. . . .  This is not, and could not be, an offense to any author.  Nobody 
writes books of purely original content.”); see also Blakeman v. Walt Disney Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d 288, 
314 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that “a modern, tightly-contested presidential race between an incumbent 
Republican and a Democratic challenger, campaign staffers and candidates pandering to voters, 
speeches, and a debate” were not protectable under the scenes à faire doctrine); Leslie A. Kurtz, 
Copyright:  The Scenes A Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 99 (1989) (“As the abstraction of an old 
and hackneyed scene is unlikely to be original, and the value to be derived from protecting it is, in any 
event, low, it may be preferable to conclude that such a scene is not protectible.”). 
 15. See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(stating that characters that “naturally flow from a common theme” are more akin to ideas than to 
expressions, and since ideas are not copyrightable such characters are therefore not subject to copyright 
protection); Benjamin v. Walt Disney Co., No. Civ. 05-2280(GPS), 2007 WL 1655783, at *7–8 (C.D. 
Cal. June 5, 2007) (holding that “30-year-old females that have escaped their humble past to pursue their 
dreams of working and living in the big city,” and that “estranged husbands” and “dream fiancés” were 
all noncopyrightable stock characters). 
 16. SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1266; see also 1 MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 
6.04 (rev. ed. 2014) [hereinafter SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW]; see, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
214 (1954) (holding that while ideas are not copyrightable, the expression of those ideas “whether 
meticulously delineating the model or mental image or conveying the meaning by modernistic form or 
color, is copyrightable.”). 
 17. SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1266 (“[A]s plots become more intricately detailed and characters 
become more idiosyncratic, they at some point cross the line into ‘expression’ and are protected by 
copyright.”). 
 18. See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A reader of unillustrated 
fiction completes the work in his mind; the reader of a comic book or the viewer of a movie is passive.  
That is why kids lose a lot when they don’t read fiction, even when the movies and television that they 
watch are aesthetically superior.”); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (holding that Mickey Mouse and other Disney characters were 
protectable apart from the stories in which they appeared). 
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This test has been criticized as a vague standard that puts judges in the role of 
literary critics.  Critics argue that this means the test is often applied incorrectly, 
such that while some characters are overprotected, other characters deserving 
protection do not obtain it.19  Moreover, while the test states that the more 
developed a character is, the more copyright protection that character deserves, 
courts do not provide much guidance for what exactly makes a character so 
developed.20  As one law review article commented, “What makes a fictional 
character worthy of protection seems to require Justice Stewart’s ‘I know it when I 
see it’ test.”21 
Standing in contrast to the other circuits which use the majority test described 
above, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the protection available to literary characters in 
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., in which it 
argued in favor of the so-called “story being told” test.22  When applying this test, a 
character does not earn copyright protection unless the character is more than a 
“chess man in the game of telling the story.”23  This is a very high standard, which 
“lends some support to the position that characters ordinarily are not 
copyrightable.”24  However, other courts and Professor Nimmer reject this test as 
unworkable and regard it as dictum because the Warner Bros. case could have been 
decided on alternative contractual grounds considered earlier in the opinion.25  
Moreover, while this standard technically remains good law in the Ninth Circuit, 
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates limited the test, holding that it does not 
apply to graphic representations.26  In fact, Air Pirates states, “[W]hile many 
 
 19. See Jasmina Zecevic, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters that Constitute the Story 
Being Told:  Who Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection?, 8 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 365, 373 (2006) (criticizing the “distinctly delineated” standard). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Gregory S. Schienke, The Spawn of Learned Hand–A Reexamination of Copyright Protection 
and Fictional Characters:  How Distinctly Delineated Must the Story Be Told?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 63, 80 (2005) (referring to Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(with regard to determining a standard for what qualifies as “obscene,” stating, “I shall not today attempt 
to further define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and 
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it.”)). 
 22. Professor Nimmer argues that with the “story being told” test the Ninth Circuit created a rule 
that is not only irreconcilable with the test that Judge Hand created, but one that if implemented would 
also annihilate copyright protection of characters generally.  1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, 
§2.12 (“There may be rare examples of such works, but for most practical purposes, such a rule if 
followed would effectively exclude characters from the orbit of copyright protection.”). 
 23. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 24. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978), (“[I]t is difficult to 
delineate distinctively a literary character. . . . When the author can add a visual image, however, the 
difficulty is reduced.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 25. See, e.g., Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(observing that the test “would be clearly untenable from the standpoint of public policy, for it would 
effectively permit the unrestrained pilfering of characters”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 
F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967) (stating that the holding of Warner Bros. did not hold that characters are 
“inherently uncopyrightable”); 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12; see also 1 SCOTT ON 
MULTIMEDIA LAW, supra note 16, § 6.04 (“The ‘story being told’ inquiry has been criticized as being 
too difficult to achieve, and the sufficient delineation test has been criticized as being too unclear.”). 
 26. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 751. 
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literary characters may embody little more than an unprotected idea, a comic book 
character, which has physical as well as conceptual qualities, is more likely to 
contain some unique elements of expression.”27  This suggests that the Air Pirates 
court is interpreting the “story being told” test as more similar to the delineated 
characters test than the Warner Bros. opinion initially suggests, because any 
character that “embod[ies] . . . more than an unprotected idea” and “contain[s] 
some unique elements of expression” could be copyrightable.28  However, the Air 
Pirates court did not explicitly overrule Warner Bros., so the relationship between 
the two seemingly irreconcilable standards remains unresolved. 
B.  INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTED CHARACTERS 
As in other areas of copyright law, the test for determining whether or not 
copyright in a protected character has been infringed is substantial similarity.29  In 
making a determination of substantial similarity, courts consider the visual 
similarities between the characters, as well as similarities of nonphysical traits and 
attributes.30  However, the mere fact that a character reminds the reader or viewer 
of a different character is not equivalent to substantial similarity.31  Courts have 
considered several factors in determining whether or not to find copyright 
infringement of characters, including:  (1) how central to the story the character 
is;32 (2) how character-driven the story is, compared with plot-driven;33 and (3) 
how significant and recognizable the character’s traits are to an audience.34  These 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12 (“From this it would seem to follow that 
a literary character may achieve separate copyrightability even if it does not meet ‘the story being told 
standard’ provided the character is sufficiently developed and finely drawn so as to cross the line from 
‘idea’ to ‘expression.’”). 
 29. See, e.g., Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Substantial 
similarity is generally a question of fact for a jury.  Summary judgment is appropriate on this issue, 
however, where ‘the similarity concerns only noncopyrightable elements of plaintiff [sic] work or no 
reasonable trier of fact could find the works substantially similar.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 30. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the 
cartoon character of Superman was protectable). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., No. H-82-2377, 1982 WL 1278, 
at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1982). 
 33. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592(WDKGX), 1989 WL 206431, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 25, 1989). 
 34. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 
1995) (holding that James Bond is a protectable character because he “is a unique character whose 
specific qualities remain constant despite the change in actors” and because audiences watch Bond, 
Tarzan, Superman and Sherlock Holmes not for the story “but to see their heroes at work”); see also 
Stallone, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (holding that Rocky and the other characters in the films were 
copyrightable because the “physical and emotional characteristics of Rocky Balboa and the other 
characters were set forth in tremendous detail in three Rocky movies” and because Rocky is associated 
with “specific character traits ranging from his speaking mannerisms to his physical characteristics”); 
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
copyrighted characters in Gone With the Wind were copied in the parody The Wind Done Gone, even 
though in the derivative work the characters were “vested with a new significance” and inverted, with 
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factors are likewise useful in determining whether and how much copyright 
protection characters should get in the first instances.  Moreover, although the 
character’s original name being used in the defendant’s work is not decisive in 
determining whether or not there was infringement, it is a factor courts consider.35 
The Second Circuit has instructed the following when determining whether or 
not character copyright has been infringed: 
What the character thinks, feels, says and does and the descriptions conveyed by the 
author through the comments of other characters in the work episodically fill out a 
viewer’s understanding of the character.  At the same time, the visual perception of 
the character tends to create a dominant impression against which the similarity of a 
defendant’s character may be readily compared, and significant differences readily 
noted. 
Ultimately, care must be taken to draw the elusive distinction between a substantially 
similar character that infringes a copyrighted character despite slight differences in 
appearance, behavior, or traits, and a somewhat similar though non-infringing 
character whose appearance, behavior, or traits, and especially their combination, 
significantly differ from those of a copyrighted character, even though the second 
character is reminiscent of the first one.  Stirring one’s memory of a copyrighted 
character is not the same as appearing to be substantially similar to that character, and 
only the latter is infringement.36 
Thus, the sheer fact that there are some differences between the allegedly infringing 
character and the allegedly copied character does not mean that no infringement has 
taken place.37  However, courts generally have been unlikely to find infringement 
of characters, even where there are many similarities, and the standard to find that 
there has been infringement is high.  For example, the Southern District of New 
York did not find infringement in a case where both characters—each named 
“Nicholas Gaunt”—were half-human, half-vampire “white males who appear to be 
in their early twenties . . . [with] thin-to-medium builds, pale skin, dark messy hair 
and a slovenly appearance.”38  The court held that while sharing a name is “a 
significant similarity,” it is not sufficient to establish substantial similarity.  In 
declining to find substantial similarity, the court looked to the differences in the 
characters’ origin stories, face shapes, clothing styles and interactions with other 
characters. 
 
strong characters becoming weak and the like, to make a political statement about the original work). 
 35. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1291 (holding that there could be 
infringement of the character of James Bond in an advertisement, even though the advertisement never 
referred to the character by name). 
 36. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 241–42 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding 
that a superhero character was not substantially similar to Superman because their similarities went no 
further than characteristics attributable to “the genre of superheroes”). 
 37. See id. at 243 (“An infringement claim would surely be within the range of reasonable jury 
fact issues if a character strongly resembled Superman but displayed some trait inconsistent with the 
traditional Superman image.”). 
 38. Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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C.  LAW GENERALLY WITH REGARD TO DERIVATIVE WORKS 
One or more preexisting works that are “recast, transformed or adapted” in any 
way are considered derivative works and, so long as they meet the low threshold of 
originality and do not infringe the underlying work, are independently 
copyrightable.39  Any “distinguishable variation” from the underlying work is 
typically considered sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.40  
Copyright owners have the exclusive right to create derivative works based on their 
copyrighted works.41  Generally, in order to qualify as a derivative work, the work 
must exist in a “concrete or permanent form” and substantially incorporate 
protected material from the preexisting work.42  The touchstone for whether or not 
a work is a derivative is substantial similarity; a work is not considered derivative if 
it merely borrows ideas rather than the expression of the work or if the changes 
made are trivial.43 
Creation of a protected derivative work does not create additional protection for 
the underlying work.44  Furthermore, where the creator of a derivative work does 
not have the right to use the underlying copyrighted material, she might lack any 
rights in the work she created, insofar as the new work relies on the copyrighted 
material.45  Several courts, and Professor Nimmer, have suggested that creating a 
subsequent work in a series using the same characters is equivalent to creating a 
derivative work.46 
D.  COPYRIGHT LAW PERTAINING TO CHARACTERS IN A SERIES 
The Copyright Act states that a work is created when it is fixed “for the first 
 
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 40. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3.01. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
 42. See, e.g., Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that MAP 
files burned onto a CD-ROM qualify as existing in a concrete or permanent form). 
 43. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that an 
Uncle Sam bank modeled after a public domain bank was not protectable because the variations made 
from the public domain version were merely trivial). 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012) (“The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only 
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material 
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.  The copyright 
in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or 
subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.”); 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 4, § 3.04 (“If the underlying work is in the public domain, a copyright in the derivative or collective 
work does not render the underlying work protectable.  Thus, the copyright in a derivative or collective 
work merely protects against copying or otherwise infringing the particular compilation or arrangement 
of a collective work, or the original contribution contained in the derivative work.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592(WDKGX), 1989 WL 206431, at *17 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 25, 1989) (holding that plaintiff’s unauthorized use of defendant’s copyrighted characters could not 
be the basis for a finding of substantial similarity to establish infringement). 
 46. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12; e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 
250, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a work that continues a previous character’s story is a derivative 
work, and citing Nimmer’s treatise for the proposition that subsequent works in a series are a type of 
derivative work), vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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time,” but where there are multiple parts or versions of a work fixed at different 
times, each individual fixed part constitutes a separate work.47  Because of this, 
when an author creates multiple works published within a series—featuring the 
same characters, fictional world, etc.—in certain circumstances, the works 
published later will enter the public domain after the earlier works.48  Therefore, 
when an author uses the same character in multiple works in a series, any elements 
revealed in works that are in the public domain are free for the public to use, while 
elements revealed in works still subject to copyright protection may not be used 
without a license.49  This standard is consistent with the law for derivative works 
generally.  Just as creators of derivative works are not granted protection for any 
aspects of their work that have been borrowed from the public domain, creators of 
series featuring the same characters in multiple works do not increase the scope of 
protection over those characters once the work in which they initially appear enters 
the public domain.50 
While in theory this makes sense, there are practical problems with 
implementing this standard.  Literature, movies and other works of art are not 
always explicit in their references, and it might not always be clear whether or not 
certain elements are being borrowed.  Professor Nimmer relies heavily on  
Silverman v. CBS, discussed in more detail below, when explaining this rule.51  
However, Silverman dealt only with characters that were sufficiently delineated in 
the original work to immediately earn copyright protection, but that were not 
further delineated over the course of the series.  This leaves open two other possible 
cases that Nimmer does not seem to consider:  (1) characters that are not 
sufficiently delineated in the original work to be deserving of very much or any 
copyright protection, but that become sufficiently delineated over the course of the 
series and (2) characters that become increasingly delineated over the course of the 
series.  For the most part, courts seem to agree with Nimmer that “flat” characters 
enter the public domain when the copyright of the first work in which the 
characters appear expires.52  However, this Note argues that courts should consider 
 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 48. This can happen either under the pre-1976 Copyright Acts, or under the current Copyright Act 
where there are multiple works in a series published by varying authors—e.g., the earlier work is 
published by a single author, but the later work is a joint work. 
 49. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12 (“[O]nce the copyright in the first work 
that contained the character enters the public domain, then it is not copyright infringement for others to 
copy the character in works that are otherwise original with the copier, even though later works in the 
original series remain protected by copyright.”); Kathryn M. Foley, Protecting Fictional Characters:  
Defining the Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 935–37 (2009) (discussing 
the case law surrounding when fictional characters appearing over the course of a series enter the public 
domain); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12 (“Clearly anyone may copy such 
elements as have entered the public domain, and no one may copy such elements as remain protected by 
copyright.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 50. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, § 2.12; see also Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 
F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 51. See infra Part I.F. 
 52. “Flat” characters are characters that, while delineated enough to warrant copyright protection, 
are not so delineated over the course of the series as to warrant increased copyright protection over the 
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increased delineation in copyright infringement cases when characters are 
sufficiently developed over the course of the series and such delineation is copied 
in a nonexplicit way, at least when such development is done in a nonlinear way.53 
 
E.  GRADUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN VISUAL WORKS:   
HARVEY CARTOONS V. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC. 
 
In Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., the Southern District 
of New York analyzed the point at which characters appearing in multiple works 
with copyrights expiring at different times enter the public domain.54  In that case, 
Harvey, the former publisher of the Casper, The Friendly Ghost comic books, sued 
Columbia Pictures for copyright infringement over the use of a ghost in the 
Ghostbusters logo.55  In the comic book series, Casper occasionally appeared with 
the “Ghostly Trio,” a group of ghosts with “knotted foreheads and evil or 
mischievous facial features.”56  Harvey claimed that one of the ghosts, named 
“Fatso,” was used in the Ghostbusters logo, but Columbia claimed that the ghost 
depicted in the logo was simply a generic ghost.57  Further, Columbia argued and 
the court ultimately agreed that Fatso had already entered the public domain and 
therefore could be freely copied.58 
Unnamed ghosts with knotted foreheads appeared in the earliest Casper comic 
books published in February 1950, the chubbiest of which was dubbed Fatso in an 
October 1954 issue.59  In the following month’s issue, Fatso “developed facial 
features and expressions nearly identical” to those of the later Fatso.60  None of the 
Casper issues printed before 1956 retained valid copyright registrations by the time 
the motion picture Ghostbusters was released.61  The court held that there were not 
sufficient changes to Fatso in the later, still-protected comic book issues to warrant 
further protection of the character.62  Applying these facts to the law surrounding 
derivative works, the court held that the entirety of the Fatso character had entered 
the public domain.63  Quoting the Second Circuit, the court stated, “[A] derivative 
 
course of the series.  See, e.g., Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 890 (N.D. Ill. 
2013); Silverman, 870 F.2d at 49–50. 
 53. See Silverman, 870 F.2d at 49 (“The fundamental copyright principle applicable to this case is 
that a copyright affords protection only for original works of authorship and, consequently, copyrights in 
derivative works secure protection only for the incremental additions of originality contributed by the 
authors of the derivative works.”). 
 54. Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 55. Id. at 1566. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1567. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (“The ‘Fatso’ character in plaintiff’s later issues contains refinements and embellishments, 
but is otherwise nearly identical to its predecessor character, which appeared in the [public domain] 
issues, except that the storylines have changed.”). 
 63. Id. at 1570–71. 
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copyright is a good copyright only with regard to the original embellishments and 
additions it has made in the underlying work.”64 
Because the underlying work featuring Fatso’s predecessor character had 
entered the public domain, the fact that the character appeared in derivative 
works—i.e., later comics in the series—did not mean that Fatso as a character 
remained protected by copyright.  However, the court was careful to point out that 
in this case the derivative works only added new storylines, which were 
protectable, and did not add revelations about the character of Fatso.65  Therefore, 
any similarities between the Ghostbusters logo and Fatso concerned non-
copyrightable elements, and there was no infringement.66  Since Harvey only 
alleged that the visual aspects of Fatso were copied, any such revelations would not 
have changed the outcome of this case.  However, this reasoning does suggest that 
if the later, still-copyrighted Casper comic book issues had featured any revelations 
with regard to the character of Fatso, those revelations might have been 
copyrightable if more than Fatso’s visual depiction were borrowed.  For example, if 
the later Casper works revealed the way Fatso died before becoming a ghost or 
demonstrated that he had an especially cruel temper when around children for some 
specific reason, these elements about the character would have been copyrightable, 
although Fatso’s traits introduced in the public domain works would not have been.  
This holding is in accordance with the law of derivative works generally, which 
allows copyright only for any additions to the underlying work, but does not 
expand copyright in the underlying work itself.67 
F.  SILVERMAN AND THE INCREMENTAL EXPRESSION TEST 
This notion of obtaining further copyright protection in subsequent works in a 
series only for the additions made to characters was further reinforced in Silverman 
v. CBS.  In that case, Silverman was seeking a declaratory judgment that the titular 
characters and names from the Amos ‘n’ Andy radio program were in the public 
domain, despite the fact that subsequent radio and television works in the series 
were still subject to copyright protection.68  The Second Circuit was tasked with 
deciding whether or not there was valid copyright in the characters using an 
“incremental expression” test.  This test paralleled the test used for derivative 
works, whereby protection in later works is only secured for “the incremental 
additions of originality contributed by the authors of the derivative work.”69  
Although the court ruled that the characters of Amos and Andy entered the public 
domain when the first script entered the public domain, the court was careful to 
point out that “any further delineation of the characters contained in the [protected] 
 
 64. Id. at 1570 (quoting Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 688 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 65. Id. (“[T]he fact that the latter issues of ‘Casper’ comic books remain copyrighted does not 
serve to protect the contents of the issues with expired copyrights.”). 
 66. Id. at 1571. 
 67. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012). 
 68. Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 69. Id. at 49. 
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radio scripts and the television scripts and programs, if it is ultimately determined 
that these last items remain protected by valid copyrights[,]“ remain protected.70  
This meant that CBS maintained copyrights in any “increments of expression” 
added to the Amos ‘n’ Andy radio scripts and television programs for which the 
copyrights had not expired “beyond what is contained in the [public domain] 
scripts.”71  However, this does not mean that every visual addition added in the 
television programs was protected; for example, the race of the characters and other 
physical features “adequately described” in the public domain scripts were not 
protected.72  Therefore, the public, including Silverman, was free to copy any story 
or character elements contained in the public domain works, but could not copy any 
“increments of expression” added in the protected works, including dialogue.73 
Taking on a similar issue, Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable focused on 
copyright ownership in the central characters of the Sherlock Holmes canon.  
Despite receiving a demand letter from the plaintiff, defendant USA Cable aired an 
unlicensed film titled Case of Evil featuring the characters of Sherlock Holmes and 
Dr. Watson.74  Although the court resolved the case based on plaintiff’s lack of 
standing to sue under the Copyright Act because the plaintiff did not properly own 
the rights to the characters, it nonetheless reviewed the facts for potential 
infringement using the Silverman incremental expression test.  Defendant claimed 
it properly used only the public domain version of the Holmes and Watson 
characters and did not otherwise draw from the protected stories.  Following the 
Silverman court’s logic, Pannonia Farms held that every element of a story, 
delineated characters included, enters the public domain when the story’s copyright 
expires.75  When there are subsequent works, only any new increments of 
expression—that is, story elements adding to those that already appeared in the 
underlying work—are granted protection.76 
Although it was not specifically addressing characters appearing over the course 
of a series, the Eighth Circuit in Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Productions 
held that an author or artist is permitted to create a derivative work based on an 
underlying work that has entered the public domain, even when later copyrighted 
works add new story or character elements.  However, the creator of the derivative 
work may only borrow expression from the public domain works, and may not 
borrow expression that appears solely in the later, still-copyrighted works.77  In 
Warner Bros. v. X One X, publicity posters from The Wizard of Oz and Gone With 
the Wind films featuring some of the main characters had entered the public 
 
 70. Id. at 50. 
 71. Id. at 49–50. 
 72. Id. at 50. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, No. 03 Civ. 7841(NRB), 2004 WL 1276842, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004). 
 75. Id. at *9. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 596–97 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“Nevertheless, this freedom to make new works based on public domain materials ends where the 
resulting derivative work comes into conflict with a valid copyright.”). 
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domain, but the actual films had not.78  The court held that “[t]he isolated still 
images included in the publicity materials cannot anticipate the full range of 
distinctive speech, movement, demeanor, and other personality traits that combine 
to establish a copyrightable character.”79  Therefore, the only aspect of the 
characters that had entered the public domain was the exact image appearing in the 
publicity materials that had entered the public domain.80  Although this case does 
not deal with characters in a series in the traditional sense, the focus on an earlier 
incarnation of a character that does not represent the entirety of the character 
appearing in subsequent works is significant. 
G.  BACKGROUND AND RULING IN KLINGER V. CONAN DOYLE ESTATE, LTD. 
In Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., Klinger—a Sherlock Holmes expert and 
writer of stories that incorporated several story elements and characters from the 
famous Sir Arthur Conan Doyle canon—was granted a declaratory judgment that 
the characters of Holmes and Dr. Watson were in the public domain.  The district 
court held, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that the characters are available for all to 
use without a license, despite the fact that Doyle’s final ten Sherlock Holmes 
stories remain under copyright protection.81  Doyle wrote the Holmes canon (four 
novels and fifty-six short stories) over a period of forty-one years, and the last ten 
of these stories remain protected until 2022.  The district court held that the 
characters of Holmes and Watson entered the public domain upon copyright 
expiration of the first story in the series.82  The Doyle estate argued that Klinger 
and any other writer seeking to use such elements must obtain a license from the 
estate to use these two characters, because the characters were so dynamic that they 
retained copyright protection until the final Sherlock Holmes story entered the 
public domain.83  The primary arguments in Klinger focused on the tenability of 
maintaining copyright protection over characters when they become more 
delineated over the course of a series of books or movies.  The courts focused 
specifically on whether a character enters the public domain when the work 
featuring the first appearance of the character enters the public domain, if the 
character is increasingly developed in a nonlinear fashion over later works in the 
series which are still subject to copyright. 
1.  Klinger v. Doyle District Court Opinion 
In granting the declaratory judgment placing Sherlock Holmes in the public 
domain, the Northern District of Illinois applied the Silverman “increments of 
 
 78. Id. at 591–95. 
 79. Id. at 598. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 458 (2014). 
 82. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 889–90 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 83. See id. at 888. 
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expression” framework, and drew from Pannonia Farms’ application of that 
framework.84  In so doing, the court held that although the characters of Holmes 
and Watson are rightly in the public domain, any “increments of expression” added 
in the protected (post-1923) works may not be used without a license,85 including 
“storylines, dialogue, characters and character traits newly introduced” in the later 
works.86  Therefore, “characters and story elements first articulated in public 
domain works are free for public use, while the further delineation of the characters 
and story elements in protected works retain their protected status.”87  This holding 
denied Klinger’s contention that the post-1923 story elements—i.e., the story 
elements that were contained in the works still subject to copyright protection—
were also in the public domain.88  Klinger had claimed that the post-1923 story 
elements were in the public domain because “they are events, not characteristics” 
and ideas, plots, dramatic situations and events are not subject to copyright 
protection.89  The court disagreed, holding that the post-1923 story elements 
“consist of a character, character trait, and storyline, which are copyrightable 
increments of expression.”90 
Although it ultimately failed, the Doyle estate attempted to draw a distinction 
between “flat” characters—created essentially in full the first time they appear in a 
fictional work and simply placed into new scenarios with no character 
development—and dynamic characters—developed over the course of the works, 
not merely to further the plot.91  The Doyle estate argued that the Silverman 
incremental expression test should only apply to “flat” characters and should not 
apply to more “dynamic” characters.92  Doyle then argued that unlike the Sherlock 
Holmes characters, the Amos and Andy characters could be considered “flat” 
because their development did not add sufficient delineation to the characters to 
warrant further protection, while the Sherlock Holmes characters should be 
considered “dynamic” because they had added sufficient delineation to warrant 
continued protection.93  Doyle argued that the character development added in the 
later works, including the changing dynamics of Holmes’ relationship with Watson, 
Holmes’ evolving worldview and new skills Holmes acquired, distinguished the 
character development here from that in Silverman.94 
 
 84. Id. at 889. 
 85. Id. at 893. 
 86. Id. at 889 (citing Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, No. 03 Civ. 7841(NRB), 2004 WL 
1276842, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004)). 
 87. Id. at 890. 
 88. Id. at 893. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. A flat character is one “that is two-dimensional, without the depth and complexity of a living 
person; the opposite of a round character.”  Doyle’s Response to Klinger’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 8, at 9.  Their personalities remain consistent from story to story; they simply find 
themselves in a unique situation each story.  Id. 
 92. Klinger, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Doyle’s Response to Klinger’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 2. 
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More importantly, Doyle emphasized the fact that the author added character 
development in a “non-linear way.”95  Essentially, Doyle argued that when 
characters are highly dynamic and the reader learns crucial information about the 
characters in a later work, a writer cannot help but be informed by this information 
in his writing of that character.  However, the district court rejected this novel 
argument, finding that Doyle “fail[ed] to offer a bright line rule or workable legal 
standard for determining when characters are sufficiently developed to warrant 
copyright protection through an entire series,” and also failed to provide case law 
supporting its position.96  “Courts do not distinguish between elements that 
‘complete’ a character and elements that do not; instead, the case law instructs that 
the ‘increments of expression’ contained in copyrighted works warrant copyright 
protection.”97  Therefore, according to the court, the test should not assess how 
delineated or dynamic the character becomes over the course of the series; rather, 
each new protectable element gains protection in its own right, regardless of 
whether it further delineates a character.  The court held that works in a series 
featuring the same character or characters are equivalent to derivative works 
because they are subsequent works featuring material from a pre-existing work.98  
As with derivative works, the court held that the threshold level of originality 
required for added incremental expression is low.99 
2.  Klinger v. Doyle Circuit Court Opinion 
On appeal, the Conan Doyle estate challenged the district court opinion on two 
alternative grounds:  first, on lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there is no 
actual case or controversy between the parties, and second, if there is jurisdiction, 
the estate is entitled to judgment on the merits because copyright in “a complex 
character . . . whose full complexity is not revealed until a later story, remains 
under copyright until the later story enters the public domain.”100  After rejecting 
the subject matter jurisdiction argument, Judge Posner agreed with the district court 
that copyright protection of fictional characters should not extend beyond the 
expiration of copyright because of alterations to the character in subsequent 
works.101  The court also cited Silverman to support this holding and rejected 
outright the notion that prequel works that make a character “rounder” should 
extend copyright protection, stating that the appeal “borders on the quixotic.”102  
Notably, Judge Posner did not believe that any actual knowledge of the contents of 
the books was necessary to resolve the dispute because Klinger averred that his 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Klinger, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 890. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 891–92. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 101. Id. at 500. 
 102. Id. at 503 (“The resulting somewhat altered characters were derivative works . . . . The 
alterations do not revive the expired copyrights on the original characters.”). 
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book would contain no material from the still-copyrighted stories.103 
The court cited several different policy reasons to support its rejection of the 
Doyle estate’s argument.  First, the opinion expressed caution about extending the 
copyright term because doing so reduces the number of works available in the 
public domain, “and so the greater will be the cost of authorship, because authors 
will have to obtain licenses from copyright holders for more material.”104  The 
court also cautioned that if the defendant’s proposed rule were implemented, 
authors would be encouraged to continue to write stories involving old characters 
rather than creating new ones, thereby discouraging creativity.105 
II.  WHY A FRAMEWORK IS NECESSARY 
In light of the current law on character copyright explained above, this Note will 
propose a test for determining when courts may consider extending some copyright 
protection to authors who expand on characters in later works when some part of 
the character has already entered the public domain.  This test will be particular to 
prequel facts, and will implement a sliding scale based on:  (1) how copyrightable 
the public domain version of the character is, based on Learned Hand’s formulation 
that the more delineated the character is, the more protection is granted to it, and 
(2) the amount, both qualitative and quantitative, the character is changed in the 
copyrighted work.  This test will be applied to the allegedly infringing portrayal of 
the character to determine the extent to which the character changes have been 
borrowed.  A character that exists in a less delineated version in the public domain, 
and a character that is much more developed in the still-copyrighted work, will be 
more likely to earn increased copyright protection, even where the new elements 
are not explicitly referenced in the allegedly infringing work. 
A.  APPLYING THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT REGIME 
There are two instances that demonstrate the extreme versions of the proposed 
test.  First, there is the situation in which a character is barely copyrightable in the 
first instance, but then becomes copyrightable in later works.  The second is a 
situation in which the public domain version of the character is already quite 
developed, but a crucial fact about the character’s history is revealed in the still-
copyrighted work. 
The first scenario, in which a public domain character is not very 
copyrightable—or may not be copyrightable at all—but then is expanded upon 
greatly in later works, seems to be somewhat akin to the Warner Bros. v. X One X 
case discussed above.106  In that case, the court held that public domain physical 
representations of characters did not allow anything about the characters to enter 
 
 103. Id. at 500. 
 104. Id. at 501. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011); see supra text 
accompanying notes 77–80. 
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the public domain except for the pictures themselves.107  Applying those facts to a 
situation in which a character lacking delineation enters the public domain but is 
later developed much more fully, it would seem that nothing would enter the public 
domain beyond the scant details provided in the public domain work.  This is also 
in line with the incremental expression test discussed in Part I.108  In such a 
scenario, it would be easier to determine whether or not the elements revealed in 
later works were borrowed because of how little is known about the character 
initially. 
However, the more details revealed about the character in the public domain 
work, the more difficult this standard would be to implement.  To demonstrate the 
latter situation described above—where a public domain character is extremely 
delineated and copyrightable, but then a copyrighted work fundamentally changes 
the reader’s perception of the character—consider the following hypothetical:  
There is a public domain work in which John, a depressed inspector, is the main 
character in a detective novel where John investigates his own brother’s murder.  In 
a copyrighted work, it is revealed that John himself murdered his brother.  If a third 
party writes fan fiction incorporating John the public domain inspector, but does 
not mention that John has murdered his brother, the author has not infringed 
according to the incremental expression test.  However, what if the fan fiction 
writer gives public domain John moments depicting meaningful looks at two boys 
playing in the park or has John purposely follow false leads in the investigation of 
his brother’s murder?  Essentially, one can imagine a fan fiction writer being able 
to write a story using the delineated public domain John in a more interesting, 
exciting way influenced by the crucial element learned in the copyrighted work 
without explicitly referencing it.  Although not explicit, these plots would 
nonetheless borrow the incremental expression added in the copyrighted work 
because they would derive some of their appeal from what readers know about 
John, independent of what the fan fiction writer tells them. 
B.  CRITIQUE OF KLINGER V. DOYLE 
Perhaps the dispositive issue in Klinger was not necessarily whether further 
delineation in a nonlinear fashion warrants increased copyright protection,109 but 
rather the fact that such nonlinear delineation likely does not to apply to the 
characters of Holmes and Watson.  Although Holmes is dynamic enough that 
courts have unsurprisingly found the character deserving of copyright protection 
generally, he is in many ways a quintessential “flat” character.110  Even Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle, the creator of Holmes, admitted that he grew tired of writing about 
 
 107. Warner Bros. v. X One X, 644 F.3d at 598. 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 68–73. 
 109. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2013); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 91–105. 
 110. See Zecevic, supra note 19, at 376 (stating that Holmes is an example of a “flatter character” 
who has been described as “a very limited and predictable character, to the extent that he is almost 
formulaic”). 
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Holmes “because his character admits of no light or shade.”111  Therefore, had the 
court been asked to analyze a series with truly dynamic characters that actually 
became increasingly delineated with prequel facts later in the series, it might have 
ruled differently. 
Furthermore, the Doyle estate could have requested higher scrutiny over 
Klinger’s work to determine if it was noticeably inspired by copyright-protected 
facts about Holmes and Watson, even if it did not reference the copyrighted facts 
explicitly.  However, the Doyle estate instead requested protection over the entirety 
of the two characters.112  Allowing such unmitigated protection over every version 
of a character, even after works that properly introduce the characters enter the 
public domain, is an unworkable standard that would fly in the face of the 
Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” restriction.113  If such protection were granted, 
in theory, the rights to a character could be continuously signed away, and new 
stories continuously created, that could allow copyright protection to exist forever.  
This would not only be undesirable from the perspective of the constitutional goal 
of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by stifling the creation of 
derivative works, it would violate the clause by allowing copyright that is not 
“limited” in duration.114 
C.  POTENTIAL ISSUES THAT MIGHT ARISE WITHOUT A NEW TEST 
A situation is easily foreseeable in which an author creates a character that is not 
sufficiently delineated to be copyrightable, but then the author expands on the 
character in later works such that the character becomes sufficiently delineated to 
deserve copyright protection.  If the original work does not have copyright 
protection and the later works are protected by copyright, it might be difficult to 
apply the incremental expression test.  It is common, for example, for a background 
character in an earlier work to move closer to the forefront of a later work in the 
series.115  For works in a series with copyrights that expire at different times, it is 
not necessarily easy to distinguish the increments of expression from the earliest 
incarnation of the character.  In the Casper case discussed above, it is likely that the 
initial character of Fatso—the one that did not have a name or a recognizable facial 
expression—would not have been subject to protection, while the later one 
would.116  This was not necessary to discuss in the case, but it is easy to see how 
this could have been an issue had the Ghostbusters film been released earlier, when 
some of the comics were still subject to copyright protection. 
 
 111. Arthur Conan Doyle, Sidelights on Sherlock Holmes, in THE BAKER STREET READER 11, 14 
(Philip A. Shreffler ed., 1984). 
 112. See Doyle’s Response to Klinger’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 3. 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
 114. See id. 
 115. As in the Newt Scamander example mentioned in the Introduction, above. 
 116. See Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564, 1567 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 54–66. 
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An example of where this exact issue could reasonably come into play, given the 
profitability of the enterprise, is the character of Newt Scamander in the Harry 
Potter series and subsequent film franchise.  Scamander is first mentioned in the 
Harry Potter series simply as the author of a textbook the Hogwarts students must 
buy, Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them, then further detailed in the “About 
the Author” section of the spinoff novel with the same title penned by J.K. 
Rowling.117  Even with these subsequent details, Scamander was a relatively flat 
character possibly lacking sufficient detail to earn high levels of copyright 
protection.  However, Warner Brothers recently announced that Rowling would 
write a screenplay focusing on Scamander as the main character.118  The books in 
which Scamander initially appears cite Rowling as the sole author, so the copyright 
will expire (as the Copyright Act currently stands) seventy years after Rowling’s 
death.119  However, it is likely that the film will be considered a joint work or a 
work for hire for which the copyright could expire at a different time than would 
the copyright in the novels.120  Since this new franchise will focus on Scamander as 
the main character, it is likely that he will become sufficiently delineated as a result 
of the films to command higher copyright protection than Rowling would have 
otherwise received for the character based on the cursory descriptions she provides 
of him in her books.  Moreover, the version of Scamander in the Harry Potter 
novels and spinoff is an older, accomplished man, while the films will focus on the 
character in his younger, more adventurous years—meaning that facts are revealed 
about Scamander in a nonlinear fashion.  Although Scamander might also be 
protected under trademark,121 the likelihood of financial success for such films 
suggests that the rights holders would seek the highest amount of copyright 
protection possible for the character.  In many years, if the copyright in the Harry 
Potter novels expires before the copyright in the films, it is easy to see how a 
Scamander fan fiction author might have difficulty determining which aspects of 
his character she may include in her story; Rowling provided enough about him 
that the reader could imagine him as a young man, but likely will include more 
elements in the upcoming films that, even if not expressly referenced, will shape 
him even further in the minds of readers. 
It was also announced that Rowling would produce a play based on Harry 
 
 117. J.K. ROWLING, FANTASTIC BEASTS AND WHERE TO FIND THEM 45–46 (2001). 
 118. H. Shaw-Williams, Harry Potter Spinoff Movie: ‘Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them,’ 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 1, 2013), http://perma.cc/39PE-D8HS (announcing that Warner 
Brothers secured the trademarks for the spinoff). 
 119. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists 
from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of 
the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”). 
 120. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2012) (“In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors 
who did not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting of the life of the last surviving 
author and 70 years after such last surviving author’s death.”); 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, 
§ 6.05 (“A motion picture is a joint work consisting of a number of contributions by different ‘authors,’ 
including the writer of the screenplay, the director, the photographer, the actors, and, arguably, other 
contributors such as the set and costume designers, etc.”). 
 121. Shaw-Williams, supra note 118. 
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Potter’s life before finding out he is a wizard.122  The same issues in terms of 
copyright expiration of joint works, compared with independent works of 
authorship, apply as with Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them.  Here, there 
will also be an increased appreciation and more nuanced understanding of the 
character of Harry Potter that derivative writers will be privy to once the books 
enter the public domain.123  Even where authors of derivative works do not 
specifically reference any increments of expression added in this later play, it is 
easy to see how such information could influence the way they write in subtle ways 
even if they do not explicitly reference the new information.  The test would be 
whether this subtle influence is sufficient for a court to find substantial similarity 
between the increments added in the later copyrighted works and the allegedly 
infringing work.124 
III.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK 
The Silverman court held that a writer may use public domain material without 
permission so long as she is careful to avoid using any expression that only appears 
as an addition in a later work that is still subject to copyright protection.125  
Specifically, the Second Circuit stated that such a writer may not use additional 
character delineation introduced in works that remain protected by valid 
copyrights.126  Because series and sequels can be categorized as derivatives, it 
seems logical that the Silverman court’s incremental test paralleled the test that is 
used to determine the extent of protection over derivative works; but the Silverman 
holding failed to consider nonlinear additions.  Although it is true that these works 
are only fictionally nonlinear—that is, they are in fact presented in an objective 
sequence—such fictional nonlinear elements can change or increase the delineation 
of a character such that a fan fiction writer could borrow these elements without 
explicitly referencing them in a way that could still satisfy the substantial similarity 
test.  For example, using again the above hypothetical of the public domain 
inspector John character, who the reader finds out in a later copyrighted work has 
killed his own brother,127 an entire fan fiction story could be written in which John 
is inspecting a different murder and is convinced the victim’s brother committed 
the act.  Without explicitly referencing that John has killed his own brother, such a 
work could conceivably be found to infringe the incremental elements added in the 
 
 122. Haley Blum, J.K. Rowling to Produce Harry Potter Stage Play, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/MAU3-8SFP. 
 123. The same issues could possibly apply to a character description supplied on Pottermore, an 
online interactive website created by Rowling.  See About Us, POTTERMORE, https://perma.cc/G32M-
GMUQ?type=source (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
 124. Note that subconscious infringement has been found in the music context.  See Bright Tunes 
Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that defendant’s 
plagiarism of plaintiff’s song was “infringement of copyright . . . no less so even though subconsciously 
accomplished.”). 
 125. Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 50 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See supra Part II.A.  Applying the Current Copyright Regime. 
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copyrighted work. 
Moreover, while the Klinger court criticized the Doyle estate for failing to 
suggest a workable test or bright line rule to determine when characters written 
over the course of a series should be protected, the Silverman test is just as murky 
with respect to nonlinear additions as any that the Doyle estate might have 
suggested.128  As the Doyle estate argued in Klinger, the current incremental 
expression test is not adequate when the creator of a derivative work is influenced 
by prequel information about a character introduced in a work that remains 
protected, when the derivative work creator does not mention that information 
explicitly.  This is especially problematic because it is extremely common for 
authors to use prequels and flashback sequences to develop characters in a 
nonlinear fashion. 
As stated above, courts have already held that fictional characters are entitled to 
copyright protection separate from the storylines of the works in which they appear 
if they are sufficiently delineated.129  But the Ninth Circuit has gone so far as to 
suggest that characters that are too tied to the plot—which would include nearly all 
fictional characters—do not deserve copyright protection.130  These tests are 
murky, and it is not immediately clear how to reconcile them with the Silverman 
incremental expression test when dealing with nonlinear character development.  
However, this section will propose a solution in the form of a test. 
The main test used to determine whether or not fictional characters deserve 
copyright protection in the first instance could be adjusted to create a standard to 
determine the narrower question of when copyright protection should extend to 
characters appearing over the course of a series.  This Note proposes that the 
current two-part test used by a majority of courts—first, that the character must be 
sufficiently delineated, and second, that the alleged infringer must have copied that 
delineation, and not simply a loose outline of the character131—should be applied to 
subsequent nonlinear delineation.  Therefore, in the context of a series in which the 
earlier works have entered the public domain and later works remain protected by 
copyright, the court should first look to whether or not there has been sufficient 
further delineation in the copyrighted works to warrant increased additional 
protection.  This test would only be satisfied:  (1) where the increased delineation 
was deemed to have fundamentally changed the character as initially perceived, to 
the point where it would be difficult for a creator of a derivative work to ignore 
 
 128. In fact, the test for copyrightability in general is no more workable than would be a test for 
delineation over the course of the series.  If copyright law does not demand a bright-line test to 
determine the extent of copyright over fictional characters generally, it only follows that it would not 
demand one to determine the extent of increased protection of fictional characters after further 
delineation in subsequent works. 
 129. See, e.g., Anderson, v. Stallone, No. 87-0592(WDKGX), 1989 WL 206431, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 25, 1989) (holding that the characters over three “Rocky” films “constitute expression protected by 
copyright independent from the story in which they are contained . . . .”). 
 130. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954) (though, as 
discussed above, this test has not retained much support even within the Ninth Circuit). 
 131. See, e.g., Warner Bros, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 
720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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these character developments in writing a work featuring the character, and (2) 
where such increased delineation was borrowed in a nonexplicit way in the 
allegedly infringing work.  In this way, just as Learned Hand stated in Nichols that 
less copyright protection for less developed characters “is the penalty an author 
must bear for marking them too indistinctly[,]”132 here only additions that 
sufficiently develop the character will warrant increased protection.  Courts could 
also look to the following factors when applying this test:  how copyrightable the 
character is in the first instance; the number of elements the original author adds in 
subsequent works that substantially change the character; and whether or not the 
defendant’s work could have been written without the details provided in plaintiff’s 
later work. 
If the first prong is met, just as in the majority test to determine if characters are 
subject to copyright protection generally, the court would determine whether or not 
this further delineation was copied.  This is not as straightforward as it might be in 
the general character copyright context because it might not be so clear that such 
delineation was copied.  The court would have to determine if the way the character 
was written in the allegedly infringing work was clearly and fundamentally 
influenced by the increased delineation found in the first prong.  This would not be 
an easy standard to meet.133 
The test this Note proposes is self-evidently not a bright line test or one that is 
easy to articulate in definite terms, but it is no less workable than the Nichols test, 
which has guided courts for generations, nor does it ask judges to serve as literary 
critics more than the Nichols test does.  It rewards creators who properly increase 
how dynamic and delineated their characters are over the course of a series by 
providing backstory, thereby incentivizing them to create more detailed subsequent 
works for readers to access.  It also ensures that writers are not granted a perpetual 
monopoly over their characters, and provides a stringent standard to ensure that the 
public is not robbed of the opportunity to create derivative works.  This is 
particularly true given the fact that for all other cases that do not involve nonlinear 
character development, the incremental expression test would continue to apply. 
A.  THE FRAMEWORK WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN HELPING TO BALANCE BOTH 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS 
It is not technically a goal of the Copyright Act to ensure that authors profit 
from their work, but it is a goal of the Act to incentivize creation so that the public 
can enjoy creative works.134  The instrumentalist approach to copyright views the 
basic goal of copyright law as the growth of culture; exclusive rights are necessary 
in order to incentivize creation in order to so grow culture.135  However, it is 
 
 132. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 133. It is necessary for the standard to be high so that authors would not easily be able to exploit 
the exception, therefore possibly extending their copyright beyond what the Copyright Act intended. 
 134. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); 122 
CONG. REC. 2834 (1976) (statement of Sen. McClellan). 
 135. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
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important to ensure that the law does not inhibit cultural growth, such as the 
creation of derivative works that might be even better than the original, because 
copyrights on the underlying works are too strong, too broad or too long.136  To that 
end, it is important to protect both of these interests—the public’s interest in 
enjoying new creative works and the creators’ private interests of profiting from 
creating them—by striking a balance that does not over- or under-protect creators’ 
works.  This holds particularly true for ensuring that fictional characters enter the 
public domain at a time that benefits both the public and the creator for many 
reasons.  For authors, characters can be extremely profitable, even and especially as 
distinguished from the stories in which they appear.  Many profitable books, 
movies and other avenues of expression with memorable characters have resulted 
in franchises that bring in huge amounts of money, only part of which comes from 
sales of the initial work.  Figurines, costumes and videogames based on the 
characters, rather than the series as a whole, bring in profits for whoever has the 
rights to charge for them.137  On the other side, there is a large market for fan 
fiction and other types of derivative works, and the Copyright Act attempts to 
incentivize derivative creations as well, so long as they are created after acquiring 
the proper rights.138 
It is important to ensure that the public has the right to use fictional characters 
for such endeavors within a reasonable amount of time, but also that the public is 
not granted such broad rights as to deprive the creation of characters of the requisite 
profitability for writers to incentivize creation.  The test suggested above would 
ensure that these important interests would be balanced.  If authors do not add 
expression that fundamentally changes an existing character, or the derivative 
work’s writer does not allow this fundamental change to influence the way she 
writes about the character, then the amount of protection already afforded by the 
Copyright Act is sufficient.  However, if the character does not become fully 
developed, or developed at all, until later in the series, the author deserves 
increased protection.  This will serve to ensure that authors remain incentivized to 
further develop their characters in new works, but also that the public will be 
entitled to use public domain versions of characters, in accordance with Silverman 
and the law surrounding derivative works. 
B.  THE FRAMEWORK WILL HELP TO PROTECT AUTHORS’ MORAL RIGHTS AND 
THEREFORE INCENTIVIZE CREATION 
Although the United States does not technically guarantee creators of literary 
works any moral rights, as are available in other countries, it remains an important 
 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).  
 136. See Karjala, supra note 9, 34–35 (discussing the balancing of public and private interests in 
the context of the ideal time and scope of authors’ control over the use of fictional characters they 
create). 
 137. See, e.g., Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564, 1566 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 138. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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facet of copyright law that certain creative works may not be misappropriated or 
destroyed while they remain protected so as to ensure that authors are encouraged 
to create.139  “One potential argument concerning the right of copyright owners to 
control the use of popular characters in new works is that of debasement, in the 
sense that whatever is created in the takeoff stories is actually something different 
from the original, diluting its cultural quality.”140  Therefore, it is important to 
balance the interests of the original creator in ensuring her characters are not used 
in a way that she would not approve of for some period of time, but also for the 
public to be able to use characters in new, interesting ways that the author might 
not have thought to use herself.  This is another area where the proposed test would 
help serve the purposes of the Copyright Act and copyright law in general.  
Although creators and copyright holders evidently have an interest in maintaining 
their characters, this need for protection cannot and need not last forever.  The test 
ensures, however, that it lasts for a reasonable period of time. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As readers of book series and watchers of long-running television shows know, 
characters in character-driven works become more to the reader or viewer than 
characters; they become fully realized dynamic individuals.  Characters can 
develop from vague ideas into complex, emotionally developed, physically 
conceptualized, life-like works of authorship.  It is common in works that run over 
a series for an author to flash back and write prequels such that the reader learns 
details about the past life of a character much later in the series.  When a character 
is so delineated and the reader learns crucial prequel information about the 
character, a derivative work writer could foreseeably have a difficult time putting 
such details out of her mind when writing about the character.  In such cases, when 
the original work is in the public domain but the prequel work remains under 
copyright, the current framework for copyright protection of characters and the 
Silverman incremental expression test do not achieve the necessary balance of 
appropriate protection.  This Note concludes that an alternative scheme that 
requires closer scrutiny into how much the protected prequel work influenced the 
derivative work would better achieve these goals.  It would ensure that there were 
sufficient incentives for the creator to continue creating and adding to her 
characters in a dynamic way, while not so widening the protection that the public 
would be completely denied access to the work. 
 
 
 139. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 140. Karjala, supra note 9, at 35–36. 
